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The framework of the international trading system is essentially a struggle
between: 1) international cooperation substantiated by the dominant economic
premises of comparative advantage, which the adherence to which begets more
acceptance of freer international trade, and 2) collective group responses to
economic impacts of trade within the restraints of respective political
institutions of a country. The extent to which interest aggregation or collective
groups permeate government trade policy depends on the type of government
and the political ideology of representatives and elites in power. At the nexus
of international and domestic trade levels, these interests have varying levels
of influence on trade policy.
I. INTRODUCTION

This article considers the dynamics of domestic politics, private sector
interests, and government institutions as they relate to international trade policy
within the context of the GATT/WTO. The context of GATT/WTO applies
when tariff bindings are established on import classifications in reduction
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schedules,' in negotiations at round discussions and yearly meetings,2 when
domestic government institutions sanction tariff levels or other issues agreed
upon at the international level,3 and when trading partners negotiate to resolve
disputes. While all of these situations are important and their dynamics will be
conspicuous when reading this article, it is the latter scenario into which this
work seeks to ultimately culminate. The argument established assumes that the
dominant theory of comparative advantage and international trade cooperation
restrains government policy-making because of the existence of long-term
commitments to freer trade and on-going mutual economic interests. However,
the ways domestic interests are represented to governments, and the ways
domestic interests influence government positions on trade issues, depend on
the functioning of domestic politics and institutions. Thus, strategic interactions between governments on trade issues can be perceived as a two-level
game: domestic politics influence states' actions at the international level,4 and
vice versa.
The argument presented is also based on comparative government.
Institutional variations of private sector-government relations will engender
different levels of representation from domestic protectionist interests.
Institutional variants among statist, corporatist, and pluralist governments will
be employed to depict dissimilar levels of private sector influence on
government.5 While the theoretical underpinnings of these three types of states
might lead one to rationally presume that one form of government would be
more amenable to free trade than others, the dynamics of collective action and
relative dependence on international trade threaten the accuracy of any obvious
conclusion.
1.
Once agreed upon this initial setting of tariffs is, for countries holding WTO membership or
those given MFN status, a multilateral international obligation that has some degree of future binding effect
on economic, private sector, and government changes on that country unless an exception is later raised.
2.
Trade round negotiations ordinarily tackle diverse issues in a deep fashion and each country
inevitably brings domestic political and economic concerns to the negotiating rounds. Similarly, yearly
meetings also discuss issues of cooperation but the meetings are limited in duration. One needs to only
consider the 1999 Seattle meeting to illustrate collective domestic dissent to the WTO since issues on the
discussion agenda were suspended.
3.
For example, in the United States, Congress approves international trade agreements and tariff
levels on goods.
4.
See alsoRobert D. Pumam, Diplomacy andDomestic Politics: The Logic ofTwo Level Games,
42 INT'L ORG. 427-60 (Summer 1988) (discussing general international relations as a two level game); ARYE
L HfIM. & PETER MOSER, Trade Liberalizationas PoliticallyOptimal Exchange of Market Access, in
THE NEW TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY (1995) (discussing trade theory as a two level game).
5.
Several authors have articulated a connection between particular government institutions and
trade policy. STEHEN D. KRASNER, United States Commercial Policy: Unraveling The Paradox Of
External Strength And InternalWeakness, in BETWEEN POWER AND PLENTY: FOREIGN ECONOMIC POUCIES
OFADVANCED INDUSTRiALSTATES (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1978). STEPHEN D. KRASNER, DEFENDINGTHE
NATIONAL INTEREST: RAW MATEIALS INVESTMENTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 10-20 (1978).

2000]

Bejesky

The paper is structured as follows. Section U presents the legal framework
and ideology driving the international trade system. It presents the policies and
rules supporting higher aggregate economic growth through comparative
advantage, as structured in the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade
(GATT) 6/World Trade Organization (WTO) framework. Within this dominant
structure for trade, Section II claims that the system of government could make
a state more susceptible to domestic positions that undermine higher levels of
trade cooperation. Section IV explains that collective action dynamics in the
private sector are the primary consideration driving more extreme government
positions on tariff binding levels or when a trade dispute erupts that requires
negotiation.
Section V utilizes the framework established in the
aforementioned sections and applies it to theoretical trade negotiations in a twolevel game model.
II. IDEOLOGICAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS

Comparative advantage is the dominant economic axiom that underlies and
lends credence to increased cooperation in trade. It says that efficiencies in the
specialization of production, based on current efficiencies in a country's
resource endowments, will provide the highest global aggregate economic
prosperity.7 If higher aggregate prosperity is a global goal and there is a
reasonable presumption of spill-over benefit, a benefit that would not exist but
for reliance on the benefits of mutual trade relations to domestic economies,
cooperation in the international system should logically occasion governments
to pro-actively reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers that skew economic
efficiencies.' While support for comparative advantage and propensity to
reduce trade barriers have dominated international economic relations for
decades, they have not always been universally accepted. Domestic institutions
and influences on policy-makers, as well as policy-makers' interpretations of
the future viability and competitiveness of local economic actors, frequently
impugn upon the suppositions on which the doctrine depends. Most countries
have traversed through protectionist shifts based on economic circumstances
and political shifts. Others have embarked on revolutionary change and
6.
General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I l, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, available at 1948 WL6858 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
7.
Helen V. Milner & David B. Yoffie, Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade
Policy and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands, 43(2) INT'L ORG. 239 (1989), available at

http://www.jstor.orrg/fcgi-bin/jstor/iewitem/fes/002081 83/dm980266198p02157/0?current res.
8.

Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest

Liberal Institutionalism 42(3) INT'L ORG. 485, 495 (1988). This assumes there is a desire for mutual
cooperation so that states can achieve the highest aggregate gains, rather than adhering to a realist or relative
gains premise which assumes that states will only cooperate in international relations when perceived gains
derived from consummating an agreement will outweigh gains provided to the other party.
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implemented new ideals about the best means of achieving economic
prosperity.
For instance, changing global and domestic economic conditions induce
governments to restrict trade. An apropos example is the circumstance prior to
the Great Depression when many countries inordinately restricted imports to
protect domestic markets.9 Conditions were placed on trade to stimulate
domestic industry and attain revenue to fund new socioeconomic obligations
that were being undertaken by governments. This resulted in trade dwindling
to a fraction of previous levels."0 Governments began to regulate economies
more, closed doors on open-market principles, and in some cases roused elites
to unveil a "statist form!"' whereby government supervision and management
of the economy, markets, and the private sector became customary. 2 Despite
this and other historical periods of protectionism, there has been a
reconfirmation of the economic superiority of comparative advantage since
World War . Barriers to trade have dwindled in the aggregate as a result of
international cooperation.' 3 With this shift in economic ideology and the
existence of international agreements supporting freer trade, increasing
cooperation has survived even dramatic international economic shocks and
domestic political turnovers. 4
Even since the Bretton Woods Agreements shortly after World War II
(marking the emergence of modern-day trade liberalization) influential
examples of closed door policies were important in the countries in which they
arose, and also served as examples for many other countries. This was the case
in many Latin American countries that shifted economic policies from one
extreme to the other during given periods of economic torment.
The Soviet Union and China, of course, provided the precedential
illustrations. Both countries until the 1980s operated on principles of planned
economic development. Under planned economic development, opening trade
doors to the international system would undermine the agenda of the central
government because the government had contrived all production necessary for

9.
Thomas Ferguson, From Normalcy to New Deal: IndustrialStructure,Party Competition,and
American PublicPolicy in the GreatDepression, 38(1) INT'L ORG. 41, 42 (1984).
10.
Id.

11.

Statism is discussed comparatively infra in section: IL Government Structure & Ideology of

Administration.

12.

These characteristics are all factors which undermine comparative advantage.

13.

Gottfried Haberler, Integration and Growth of the World Economy in HistoricalPerspective,

LIV(3) AMER. ECON. REV. 1(1964), ava/ab/e at httpJ/www.jstor.org/fcgi-bin/jstor/viewitem.fcg/00028282/
di950379/95p0160q/0?curfentrest.
14. International covenants can restrain government actions and establish parameters for trade
policies because the legality of international agreements survives replaced administrations and binds a state
to previously ratified agreements.
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society in multiple year plans. Under such a system, permitting imports to
freely flow into the country could spawn instability in domestic production by
engendering reliance upon, or a demand for, foreign products. The government
had already projected what society needed and wanted. In the alternative,
authorizing goods to depart from the country as exports because they might
fetch higher prices on international markets could eventuate domestic deficits
in these goods and halt production for internally projected requirements.
Outside of these circumstances, where large scale agendas to close doors
to rectify poor economic conditions caused long-lasting revolutionary shifts in
countries, the international trade system since World War 1I has gradually
become more liberalized and freer. However, short-term intermittent political
shifts within countries based on political turnover have also been an important
consideration in international trade.
In the context of trade, domestic political turnover occurs when differing
ideologies and economic programs have been enacted by political shifts in a
country's government. Such shifts result in the enactment of new policies that
are either more or less open to trade than were the previous policies. However,
the decision of a current administration to ratify a trade agreement to reduce
trade barriers should bind a successor government, even if that subsequent
administration is ideologically more protectionist. This means that without a
complete withdrawal from the international trade system, the degree of policy
change by a more protectionist regime will be restrained because of the
regime's desire to attain the benefits of future international trade. International
bindings are never completely resolute, but a protectionist government's full
purview of policy-making is somewhat harnessed by obligations made to the
international community. Even though protectionist governments may
maneuver within treaty obligations, for exceptional circumstances, or stretch
international obligations, 5 the global result has been an increasingly
institutionalized international framework supporting trade liberalization.
The GATT/WTO is the global international regime/rule structure. Its rules
and principles incorporate the dominant economic ideology of comparative
advantage by supporting less restricted trade. Although this ideology and
framework is accepted, it is not conclusively followed because countries do
introduce barriers to trade in order to protect domestic industries. 6 This is
15.

To not permit some leniency could impede more countries from joining international regimes

or cause more pervasive denouncements of international agreements and regimes, which can undermine the
credibility of international law and attenuate the likelihood of future cooperation. The Reservations to the
Genocide Convention Case, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 31, available at 1951 WL 3.
16. This is often the case when domestic firms are less efficient than foreign counterparts. Herein,
"efficiency" can be described as a per unit cost and will generally vary based on the evolution of an economy

because higher costs are expected when producing goods in countries with a higher standard of living, since
wages are higher.
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often how disputes arise. Therefore, countries that have previously made
binding obligations among themselves to attain reciprocal rights with trading
partners, or that have assented to the general framework of the GATT/WTO,
have to some degree undermined the functioning of or violated that
international framework. In other cases, such countries have strayed too far
from the rules and policies to which they said they would adhere. The GATT's
general mission has always been to reduce trade barriers and eliminate
discrimination against contracting parties' 7 that have Most Favored Nation
status.' However, specific GATT rules tend to undermine an unwavering
adherence to its general policies. These rules are needed to provide an
international outlet for domestic economic needs and to protect the agreement's
overall integrity by tempering its flexibility. These outlets might include setting
a tariff binding higher than was originally agreed upon to protect domestic
industries, 9 utilizing safeguards and adjustments assistance authorized in
Article XIX of the GATT 1947, 2" and providing industries with various
forms
2
of subsidies and tax credits to maintain competitive advantages. '
For purposes of this article, GATT/WTO provisions will only be
considered from their policy position of supporting freer trade or undermining
freer trade. The paramount concern herein is to generally highlight domestic
actions that stray outside the international trade framework. In other words, the
analysis examines state actions that depart from its previously undertaken
obligations because of domestic influences. The domestic influence that
undermines this general policy can emerge from two primary variables: 1) an
institutional governing structure that might be, by its nature, more amenable to
protectionism, and 2) collective groups that place varying levels of pressure on
policy-makers to modify a trade policy position.
Both of these influences can shift a trade posture from what may be most
economically optimal globally, within general policies and rules of the
17.
The GATT Preamble states that its purpose is for contracting parties "to enter into reciprocal
and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to
trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce." GATT 1947, supra note
6, at pmbl.
18.
Article I of GATT requires that like products of a contracting party be accorded treatment no
less favorable than those of other contracting parties.
19.
The Harmonized Tariff Schedule provides categorizations for imports that have assessed duties

by domestic government institutions. The tariff level on products are generally expected to decrease over
time, but a country's choice to set some tariffs high may be perceived as protectionist for certain domestic
industries.
20.
This includes establishing higher tariffs and/or quotas on imports when there are "increased
imports causing or threatening to cause serious injury to an identified United States industry." TRADE AcT
OF 1974 § 201 (1974).
21.
While subsidies are for the most part restricted by the GAT/WTO, they will only become
issues when there is a significant change in market share of a product that can be tied to the subsidies.
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GATT/WTO, to a short-term policy that might be perceived as serving the
interests of representatives in power or domestic interest group structures. This
varying level of influence, based on institutional dissimilarities across countries
in private-public sector relations, and collective private sector actions, are
discussed in the succeeding two sections.
II. GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND IDEOLOGY OF ADMINISTRATION
A.

Government Structure

Even though dominant economic ideology and international
institutionalization support free trade and cooperation, the private sector can
influence trade policy at the domestic level based on statist, corporatist, and
pluralist government classifications. The private sector's influence on
government trade policy affects the vacillation of policy preferences. It also
affects the extent to which the rule framework of liberalizing trade is adhered
to by individual countries (including during abrupt shifts via change of political
ideology in government), and the dynamics of international trade negotiations.
In a statist government,22 public and private sector interests are unified.23
Government interference in the economy is perceived as normal and
beneficial.24 However, the more a government is involved in the economy, the
more the country is perceived as straying from free market principles. The
country is perceived to be distorting the economically optimal results ordinarily
consistent with premises supported by comparative advantage and prescribed
and accepted by the international trading system. This may be the case even
though statist governments often exist in countries that are resource dependent
and not economically dominant. These governments must act within the
framework of international trade cooperation, because they cannot control the
system.2' On the other hand, because government and private sector interests
are unified, the government's desires, the calculation of potential economic
A good example is Japan. PETER J. KATZENSrEIN, Introduction: Domestic andInternational
22.
Forcesand Strategies of ForeignEconomic Policy, and Conclusion, in BETWEEN POWER AND PLENTY 16,

19, 297, 306, 308, 333 (Peter J.Katzenstein ed.), availableat http://www.stor.org/fcgi-bin/jstor/viewitem.
fcg/00208183/dm980220/98p0031g/0?cunfentres.
MIutAN R. DASKA, THE FACES OF JUSICE AND STATE AUTmORrrY 80-88 (1986).
23.
24.
This is a common characteristic for small developing countries where the government tries to
manage the economy to achieve national goals. JOAN M. NELSON, The PoliticalEconomy of Stabilization:
Commitment, Capacity, andPublicResponse, 12(10) WORLD. DEV. 983, 988 (1984). A very high degree
of cooperation between business and government is found in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and
Malaysia. By contrast, in the United States, a pluralist system (discussed infra), the only sector in which
there are close government-business relations is the defense industry because of national security concerns.
James Kitfield, The New Partnership,NAT'LJ. 1840-44 (1994).
25.

PETER J. KATNSTEIN, CORPORATISM AND CHANGE: AUSTRIA, SWflZERLAND, AND THE

POLMCS OF INDUSTRY (1984).
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benefits, and policy preferences should be somewhat restrained by the legal
framework of international trade and the cognizance of the need for long-term
international cooperation. Thus, sporadic domestic collective interests that
might otherwise influence government policy-making are unlikely to arise in
statist governments. Those interests are already represented by the intimate
nexus between the private sector and government,' even though the
government's institutional framework rejects market mechanisms and private
sector freedoms.
In a corporatist government structure, public policymakers and private
interests inhabit the same social and economic agenda. There is still a formal
and independent private sector apart from the government. Corporatism is
known for its national social partnership between government, business, and
labor. A concentrated system of licensed interest coalitions regularly bargains
with government, seeking policy positions that appease societal and collective
groups in a way that is in the best interest of society.27 There is less
government involvement in the economy than in a statist system. However,
government influence on the private sector is still a natural extension of
authority. Formal institutions may join the central government with the private
sector. Mediating institutions may also provide for periodic negotiations and
compromise.28 A line of demarcation can be drawn between the public (or
government's) role and the role of private sectors (unlike in statist
governments), even though the government will favor particular industries or
firms based on perceived societal need.
In pluralist government systems, government activities and private sector
activities have clearly defined roles. Government has regulatory authority in
the economy, but should not unreasonably interfere with the functioning and
rights of the private sector.29 Individual private sector actors operate within the
framework of market forces. Individually or collectively, they sporadically
advocate trade policy interests to government and representatives through
political forces. These unstructured and non-aggregated private sector forces
26. The level of influence of this argument has been questioned. H. Richard Friman, Rocks, Hard
Places, and the New Protectionismv Textile Trade Policy Choices in the United States and Japan,42(4)
INT'L ORG. 695 (1988), available at http://www.jstor.org/fcgi-binljstor/ view.fcg/00208183/dm980264/
98pO20050?currentRes.
27.
PETER J. KAESTEN, SMALL STATES INWORLD MARKETS: INDUSTRIAL POUCY INEUROPE
22-30 (1985).
28.
Michael Moran, FinanceCapitalandPressure-GroupPoliticsin Britain, 11(4) BRMISHJ. POL
SCENCE 381, 383 (1991).
29.
This is analogous to a "reactive state" apparatus whereby the public sector's obligation is to
solely provide a supporting framework within which citizens pursue their own chosen goals. DAMASKA,
supra note 23, at 73. Thus, actors in the private sector compete amongst themselves for a larger share of the
societal pie and government plays little role in favoring one party over another. The belief is that this
competition will lead to efficient markets through competition.
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have the potential to dramatically influence government trade policy. Such
influence will arise when the composition of resource endowments and
collective advocacy mechanisms is favorable. 3° Thus, despite the pluralist
system's institutional propensity to keep government out of efficient markets,
the government may taken together be even more prone to be protectionist in
pluralist than statist systems. Statist systems lack strong private sectors and
often do not treat market mechanisms as sacrosanct. The pluralist government
may also be more protectionist than a corporatist system government. In a
corporatist government, national collective entities represent private sector
interests. Both corporatist and statist governments, however, tend to proactively plan for the economy.
If one conceives of the individual roles of government and the private
sector, with the government's defined obligation being to provide for the public
good and the private sector's role to stimulate the economy, the following
visual depicts the intimate private sector-government nexus that exists in a
statist government. Pacification of extreme private sector-government positions
through interest negotiations occurs at the national level in a corporatist
government. Collective action groups from the private sector directly influence
government policy-makers in a pluralist government.

Statist

Corporatist
Pluralist

]M~uie Sack:

Figure 1
Based on the three forms of government, one would rationally presume
that a statist government, because its institutional form normally permits the
government to significantly influence markets and the economy, would have
attributes most apt to disrupt cooperative trade arrangements or distort global
economic production efficiencies. However, even if this was the expectation
given the institutional characterization, the political ideology of the current
government in power may not be entirely consistent with such institutional
30.
Policy.

See discussion infra in Section: IV.Collective Action Groups & Political Influence on Trade
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expectations. This is ordinarily the case with trade dependent countries or
when levels of economic development are especially amenable to export
dependent interests.
B.

Ideology of the Current Government on Trade Issues

While each of these three government constructs of government-private
sector relations may comprise an institutional and historical propensity for freer
trade or protectionism, the ideology of the government or representatives in
power can cause a drift in either direction. For instance, while there is a more
natural institutional framework for the operation of market forces in pluralist
systems than in corporatist or statist systems, administration changes and
economic development adduce policy vacillation over time in all types of
governance structures. This was the case with Republican-Democrat policy
shifts in the United States.
Trade policy is established by elected representatives in democracies
because it can impact the public interest and is a form of taxation. This means
that the ideology of those in power should to some extent represent the will or
position of the populace and result in temporal shifts in trade policy based on
the composition of the economy. For instance, in the United States, up until
World War I, firms were labor-intensive, but shifted after World War I because
domestic capital-intensive organizations began to dominate world markets. 3
Concomitantly, during this time and up until 1950, the percentage of
Republicans in Congress voting for trade liberalization was very low, while
Democrats nearly unanimously favored trade liberalization.32 Since 1950, the
percentage of Republicans and Democrats favoring trade liberalization
equalized,3 3 likely because higher levels of exports from capital-intensive and
highly competitive United States firms formed a unified national interest.'
Certainly, there is always some degree of amalgamation between popular-based
or electoral public choice and private sector influences (that provide funding to
support a campaign) on politicians' trade policy positions.3 5 The balance of
these will be dependent on the government's particular electoral institutional
framework.3 ' Recently, however, it is even more difficult to argue that United
31.
Ferguson, supra note 9, at 55-56.
32. Ile percentage of Republicans favoring trade liberalization was between 0% and 20% from
1913 to 1940 and began to climb thereafter. Democrats favoring trade liberalization hovered around 90%
from 1913 to 1962. Michael A. Bailey eL al., The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics,
Coalitions, and International Trade, 49 WoRLD POLmrcis 309, 312 (1997).
33.
Id at 312.
34.
Id at 334.
35.
J. MARK RAMSEYER, Public Choice, nCHICAGOLECTuRESINLAWANDECONONCS 101 (Eric
A. Posner ed., 2000).
36.
Id. at 105.
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States trade policy is being driven by the will or desires of the populace3 7 or
clearly defined partisan influences, but instead by factors such as: the level of
national income,3" segmentation and position of major industries in the world
economy, and migration of old firms into new production methods and the
emergence of new and more modem industries. 9
Placing generalizations regarding political predisposition aside for a
moment, even diametrically opposed partisan positions may agree on trade
policy as blindly following strict assumptions about comparative advantage and
free market principles without utilizing government intervention to promote
exports and restrict imports in the short-run. This may not always be in the best
interest of the country, because it may be necessary to protect an infant industry
from foreign competition that has a first-mover advantage,' or to raise national
37. On the other hand, at some level, one can claim that the aggregate of voter preferences will have
some relation to a country's aggregate position on trade issues and tariff levels. However, the alternative is
to claim that it is the sum total and degree of protectionist interests (in the private sector) that influence
politicians to hold a particular position on trade. This paper segregates the latter as the independent variable
for analysis. While this is an issue that can be tested empirically, measuring cause and effect relations
between constituent positions and political positions will be problematic. Logic would posit that there are
numerous problems today with claiming that political constituency influences directly drive representative
positions or can be utilized as a predictive indicator for expected trade policy positions in democracies. First,
it is difficult to segregate voters into their rational choice positions because they may not be concerned with
only one factor of production, or simply "free trade." ROBERT E. BALDWIN, The Political Economy of
Protectionism,in IMPORTCOMPETrnON AND RESPONSE 268 (J.N. BHAGWATi&T.N. SRINIVAsAN eds., 1982).
Voters may be concerned with two or more factors of production, or free trade on some items and protection
on others. This results in cross-cutting tariff preferences. WOLFGANG MAYER, Endogenous Tariff
Formation,74(5) AMER. ECON. REV. 970,983 (1984). Second, even if voters are acting in their rational selfinterest and are more apt to vote for a candidate that will best support the economic interests of the voter.
Id. at 974. Voter interests are often too diverse (outside of favoring protectionist policies if the candidate is
directly affiliated with labor or freer trade policies if he/she is more affiliated with capital) to register any
changes in tariff policy. Id. at 983. Third, to assume voters primarily impact trade preferences suggests that
contributions received or a pecuniary interest endowed from interest groups to politicians are not directly
translatable into political support, but are made to increase constituent support When a trade position
becomes an election issue in national elections, a politician's position is framed not as industry specific, but
as a general position somewhere between the dichotomous classification of free trade and protectionism. This
leads to the obvious problem of aggregating individual interests into general policy positions. On the other
hand, while constituents are also consumers, they have little ability to influence the political process through
campaign contributions. ARYEL HILMAN &HEINRICH W. URSPRUNG, Domestic Politics,ForeignInterests,
and International Trade Policy, 78(4)

AMER. ECON. REv. 729, 732 (1988),

available at

httpJ/www.jstor.org/fcgi-bin/jstor/viewitem.fcg/00028282/ di95002/95p0008d/0?currentRes. This is due
to diffuse interests, the difficulty for consumers to identify economic interests from imperceptible benefits
and costs involved in international trade, and the dynamics of the political process.
38. Ferguson, supra note 9, at 56.
39. U at 57.
40.

Pankaj Ghemawat, Sustainable Advantage, 64 HARV. BUS. REV. 53 (1986). "First mover

advantage" is a business term suggesting that a firm that enters a market first has the ability to attain a larger
share of the market because of quick action even though other viable competitors may exist and could garner
more market share if action were taken more promptly by these competitors. Id.
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income by promoting the profitability of firms in imperfect markets.4 ' A
government may strategically use trade policy to obtain a larger share of
domestic and/or international markets and profits for its multinational
companies. This is because doing so could be expected to stimulate the
domestic economy and increase the tax base. Such a decision must be made
while considering international interdependencies, because enacting trade
policies that favor nationally-based interests can reverberate with trading
partners when a noticeably higher tariff level in one industry or non-tariff
protectionist measure is employed to safeguard domestic interests or when a
government utilizes subsidies to promote exports. This could legitimately be
met with a higher reciprocal tariff level on other important industries.
As a caveat, because this analysis is concerned with domestic interactions
between government and the private sector, it downplays the dynamic nature
of comparative interactions among other government institutions. For instance,
separation of powers between the executive branch and legislature can
influence how and where interest groups spend time and resources to influence
trade policy. 2 Strategic advocacy and planning by interest groups can probe
the dynamics of inter-branch relations to determine how they can best influence
policy-making. And perhaps, if the current legislature supports trade
liberalization, it could leave a lasting mark on trade policy long after its tenure
ends by changing trade policy or rules so that a later executive and legislature,
if more protectionist, could be restrained from making abrupt changes in the
trade framework since its purview of action might be corralled by the
previously established rules.4" Because of the added complexity, applicability
almost solely to governments with strict separation of powers," and frequent
policy-preference shifts in the short-term via electoral cycles, government
policy-preferences will be treated herein as a unified position at the
international level. This means that the private sector influences a "government
position" rather than the position of the executive or the legislature. This is
41.
A. Dixit, InternationalTrade PoliciesforOligopolisticIndustries,94 ECON. J. 1 (Supp. 1984).
42.
Specifically, when the executive branch opens negotiations with the expectation of
consummating an agreement with a foreign government over trade, the greater the degree of authority that
the legislature has over agenda setting, amending agreements, ratifying proposals, calling referendums, and
deploying side payments, the more that there is a relative shift in power to the legislature vis-a-vis the
executive. HELEN MiLNER, INTERESTS, INST1nmrnoNs AND INFORMAnON: DOMEsTiC POLmnCs AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 101-12 (1997).
43.
Bailey, supranote 32, at 326.
44.
Government systems with strict separations of powers are most characteristic of presidential
systems that legally and practically have a strong balance of power between the president and legislature, as
distinguished from parliamentary systems where elected representatives choose a prime minister as the
executive and retains substantial control over that position (i.e., limiting what is perceived as a separation of
powers between the policy-making branches of government). Thus, the United States may be one of only a
few countries in the world that has such a system.
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because the positions of these two institutions may differ based on political
affiliation or constituency allegiances.
While differing political positions, sometimes based on party affiliations,
can provide a predisposition toward a particular trade policy, private sector
collective interests can impact government trade policy in a way that deviates
from predispositions. For instance, a recognizable problem occurs in pluralist
governments because representatives may neither represent the will of the
populace, nor act in a way to protect the long-term viability of the domestic
economy. Instead, they act primarily to further their own self-interested reelection concerns by accommodating interest groups.45 Such actions, even
though they result in lower aggregate wealth for the populace in the end, are
inherent in democracies.'
Regional constituency interests can form
representatives' trade policy preferences.
To summarize the article to this point, within the institutional variations
of statism, corporatism, and pluralism, government interactions with the private
sector differ and dissimilarly influence a government's short and long-term
position on trade issues. While there is an international ideological and
institutionalized propensity to favor policy-positions consistent with the theory
of comparative advantage and liberalizing trade, there are short-term benefits
of protectionism and transition costs for government on long-term efficient uses
of resources. Specifically, the short-term trade position of government will
depend on: 1) the degree to which government is sequestered from pressure
groups representing the private sector, 2) the economic power of the state, 3)
international relations with trading partners and present government dedication
to freer trade, and 4) an assessment of the degree of domestic economic harm
from given imports. The interaction of these variables will be considered in the
successive two sections.
IV. COLLEcrIvE ACTION GROUPS AND POLITICAL
INFLUENCE ON TRADE POLICY

Interest groups can dynamically influence trade policy, particularly in the
context of setting tariff bindings. Interest groups express political support for
candidates and party platforms47 through campaign contributions," in an
45. WuInAM A. BROCK & STEPHEN P. MAGEE, Tariff Formation in a Democracy, in CURRENT
SSUES ININTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL POUCY AND DIPLOMACY 1-9 (J. Black & B. Hindley eds., 1980).
46.
Bailey, supra note 32, at 328.

47. An election between two parties generally consists of a party thatrepresents a more protectionist
position and one that advocates more liberalized trade. The two parties commit to their respective policies
to garner support in the populace to get elected. STEPHEN P. MAGEE ET AL., BLACK HOLE TARmFS AND
ENDOGENOUS POLICY THEORY: POLMCAL ECONOMY IN GENERAL EQUILBRIUM (1989). However, as
mentioned, the degree to which this acts as an essential issue in the mind of voters is questionable.
48. This isthe case with political action committees inthe United States (PAC contributions). Gene
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amount likely correlated to the extent that tariff preferences are provided.49
These preferences appear in annually "choosing a vector of trade taxes and
subsidies on the various import and export goods."'se However, the domestic
political influence from these collective action dynamics of interest groups will
differ among pluralist, corporatist, and statist governments.
The duty assessed on import classifications of goods will affect domestic
factors of production in industries. A computer manufacturer will want to
attain imported component parts to assemble its product at a lower cost (i.e.
lower tariffs on components), but would not want low tariffs on the import of
competing foreign computers. Consumers or other domestic users would desire
lower tariffs on imported computers to make them less expensive for
purchase.5 The result across all sectors and regions in a country 2 is a
competition for resources where the implementation of one tariff policy will
have a rippling effect across other sectors of society, granting a larger income
53
share to protected industries than would ordinarily result without the tariffs.

The winners in this game of competing interests are those groups that can
best get their position heard and acted upon by politicians. Tariff policy
positions will favor industry groups that are best organized' and have more
resources to influence policy-making bodies." Thus, the general presumption
M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Protectionfor Sale, 84 AMER. ECON. REV. 142-53 (1994), availableat
http:lwww.jstor.orgfcgi-bin/viewitem.fcg/00028282/ di976326/97p01515/0?currentresl.
49.
The more that it is perceived that a politician, group of politicians and/or party grants
preferences to an interest group, the more that it will contribute to those political actors.
50.
Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Trade Wars and Trade Talks, 103(4) POL. ECON. 675,
679 (1995).
51.
A macroeconomic example of the conflicting interests that industrialized countries have faced
is the inter-play between generalized interests of agriculture, industry, and consumer preferences. If tariffs
on agriculture are high to protect domestically grown foodstuffs from imports, domestic agriculture interests
will be appeased, but this high tariff will have a negative impact on consumers (assuming no government
subsidization) who will be paying more for food products as well as on industry which will eventually need
to increase labor wages based on a higher cost of living. If tariffs on imports that compete with industry are
high, industry will be delighted because profitability will be higher and domestic labor will be pleased
because protectionism protects labor, while agriculture interests will be distressed because profitability will
be lower due to more import competition. Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey, Specific Factors,CapitalMarkets,
Portfolio Diversification,and Free Trade: Domestic Determinantsof the Repeal of Corn Laws, in 43(4)
WORLD POLrns 545-69 (1991).
52.
F.W. TAussiG, THE TARpHI
RY OF THE UNrrED STATn 68-108 (1964).
53.
Kiyono Kazuharu et al., IndustrySpecific Interests and Trade Protection: A Game Theoretic
Analysis, in 42(4) ECON. STUDIES QUARTERLY 347, 352 (1991).
54.
Grossman & Helpman, supra note 50, at 705.
55.
More specifically, one could also posit that organization andcollective action are most effective
with fewer individuals sharing in gains that will be produced by attaining a particular tariff policy. With too
many individuals, there will be "free riders" that will not participate in the action because divided gains from
a changed tariff policy will be smaller than the effort that must be exerted to attain the policy by any one
member. Thus, the optimal time for concerted action or when self-interest will propel action the most is when

2000]

Bejesky

and simplified theoretical framework for purposes of this paper is that relatively
more concentrated (and perhaps "scarce") factor endowments will be a unifying
collective force attaining more trade protection.' However, much explication
and many caveats should be added.
As has been previously described, manufacturing firms in the United
States in the post war period sought either free trade or protectionism. This has
also been the case in foreign countries based on the level of that country's
production efficiencies in internationally competing goods. Firms without
foreign operations confronting competition from imports would advocate
protectionism, while multinational firms and export-dominant corporations
would advocate freer trade.-" A simplified dichotomization of what is really a
complicated world of cross-cutting interests, is that firms with a strong position
vis-A-vis international competition will advocate for an open economy world
with little government intervention to hinder free markets. Firms that have a
weak position vis-i-vis foreign rivals will request government protection.5"
Competing interests across these two categorizations can and do exist. For
instance, if a government has dedicated itself via international agreement to
lowering tariffs in the long-run, there may be an aggregate or threshold level of
protection59 that can be provided by the government before it loses trade policy
credibility with trading partners. In that case, affected industries will struggle
amongst themselves for tariff levels and/or quota protection from specific
import items. °
Within this competition among industries, the diversification of that
industry will partially determine the potential for aggregation or political power
of collective influence groups. 6 If an industry is highly segmented, that
industry may take longer to aggregate a common position and/or have a less

there is a monopoly or oligopoly in the sector at issue. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COL.ECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1968).
56.
RONALD ROGOWSKI, COMMERCE AND COALITIONS:
ALIGNMENTS (1989).
57.
Milner & Yoffie, supranote 7, at 239.
58.
Ferguson, supra note 9, at 53.

59.

How TRADE AFFECTS DOMESTIC

Aggregate levels of protectionism could moderately shift over time with changes in the

dedication of political representatives to either freer trade or protectionism, and the type of government
(statist, corporatist, or pluralist).
60.
Kazuharu, supra note 53, at 348.
61.
The Ricardo Viner "specific factors model" is a neoclassical economics trade theory that defines
factor inputs as being either industry specific or inter-sectorally mobile. Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey, Specific
Factors, Capital Markets, Portfolio Diversification, and Free Trade: Domestic Determinants of the Repeal
of the Corn Laws, in 43(4) WORLD POLrIICS 546, 546 (1991), available at http://www.jstor.org/fcgibin/jstor/viewitem.fcg/00438871/di971264/97p/0090g/ 0?curretrest.
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intense influence on government when responding to trade concerns.62 The
more specific that a product or factor of production can become to a smaller or
more closely knit group of economic actors, the more likely that an interest
benefiting that group will get enacted, ceteris paribus. In advanced economies,
factors may become more inter-sectorally mobile and thus domestic policy may

be less emphatic on tariff level changes. This is because of counteracting
interests across sectors, even though several lobbies in a country could pursue

a common goal.63
This private sector competition to sway trade policy preferences and the
extent of influence of these collective action dynamics will be most
conspicuous in pluralist systems because of a more direct private sector impact
on representatives. Collective action winners in the pluralist system should be
more apt to attain amenable tariff bindings or perhaps receive non-tariff barrier
assistance. In statist and corporatist governments, labor and capital cooperate
on trade policy to fashion a more moderate position that should be based on
long-term economic projections and viability ofcompetitive industries, and less
on collective action dynamics. This does not mean that when comparing all
three forms of government, higher tariffs would be less ardently favored on
factors annexed to less identifiable and less aggregated interests or on industries
that are not as important to the domestic economy in statist and corporatist
systems. It means that the institutional variable of government interference in
the market is more dominant in statist and corporatist governments, while the
private sector influence is more dominant in pluralist systems.
This is the case since all three forms of government can have less
diversified economies and central industries. Those dominant industries will
control trade policy on specific goods and have elevated support in government.
The premise is most clear, however, in developing countries where
industrialization has recently emerged and policy-making deference is given to
particular industrialized sectors before agricultural interests. Here, there may
be less lobbying by groups in developing countries to influence politicians to
decrease trade barriers in prime foreign markets on agricultural products as this
might beget a stronger export industry for agricultural products and eventually
push up the price of agricultural goods domestically." This is because
agricultural exports could fetch higher prices in international markets and drain
domestic supply. This could precipitate domestic societal distress and although

62. Michael Porter, The Structure Within Industries and Companies: Performance, 61 REV. OF
ECON & STATS. 217 (1979).
63.
Grossman & Helpman, supra note 50, at 685.
64.
Gerald C. Nelson, Rent Seeking in North-South Agricultural Trade, 16 EUR. REV. OF AGRIC.
ECON. 53, 54 (1989).
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it is globally a less optimal position, it is one which would appease the
increasingly commanding position of industry in a developing country.
Using the two polarity classification of market segmentation and the
number of firms in an industry (indicating a general propensity for efficacy to
attain policy-change), one can also consider an example where an industry may
have numerous members with more homogenized interest (low market
segmentation) and an industry with a handful of firms with greater diversity of
interest (high market segmentation). In this example, the factors work against
each other. Despite a large number of actors, thirty firms could unite
collectively for an economic interest and advocate for and attain amenable
government trade policies. Conversely, a three firm industry may not be able
to unite because of competitive agendas or the low unity of factor interests. 65
(See Figure 2).
Even with the complexity of existent crosscutting interests, the importance
of private sector influences on trade policy is rather straightforward. If
collective action dynamics can emerge in a country based on attributes of the
economy and industry, that emerging interest should be most influential on
One Firm
More Likely
to Have
Collective
Influence on
Government

N. Interest

Significant

Nogmntrest

Interest

Segmentation

Segmentation

Least Likely to
Have Colective
Influence on
Government

Numerous
Firms
Figure 2

65.
Others have said that in particular instances, such as with the financial community in Britain,
"the more dispersed the institutions, the more likely were they to be driven to formal organization." Moran,
supra note 28, at 386.
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government and lead to more extreme tariff bindings in a pluralist system
because of the direct interest that can be placed on government. If politicians
choose trade policy preferences on tariff bindings unilaterally, without
considering international implications and relations, high tariffs or other
protectionist measures could violate the international trade framework. If a
trading partner recognizes economic losses to its industries based on a
suspected breach of another country's international trade obligations, a trade
dispute may arise. For example, when subsidization,6 dumping, 67 or
discrimination" is alleged, the allegations could be matched with
countervailing 9 or antidumping 7° duties. It is the dynamics of this domestic
variable that will be applied to the model in the next section. Section V
describes the influence of the private sector on international negotiations
between governments and nexus between the domestic and international levels
when a trade dispute erupts.
V. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Many scholars recognize inter-linkages between domestic politics and
international relations. 1 Many have even suggested that "the main purpose of
all strategies of foreign economic policy is to make domestic policies
compatible with the international political economy."72 It is also assumed that
long-term protectionism is not the optimal strategy for any country and that a
government may protect certain industries. Such protection may be desirable
to safeguard a national economic policy, even if doing so undermines
international commitments, or to appease interest groups that are advocating
preferential treatment over other private sector entities 73 and thus influencing
social and economic policy.74 While the last section explained this theme in
relation to tariff bindings, this section offers a theoretical model of private

66. GAT 1947, supra note 6, at art. XVI.
67. Id at art.Vi.
68. This may include discrimination vis-A-vis other foreign competitors (GAIT 1947, art. I),or
discrimination vis-a-vis domestic goods GATT 1947, art. Ill).
69. GATT 1947, supra note 6, at art.Vl. InUnited States law, see 19 USC § 1671.
70. Id at art. VI. In United States law, see 19 USC § 1673.
71.
See, e.g., JAMES ROSENAU, Toward the Study of National-InternationalLinkages, in JAMES
ROSENAU, LINKAGE POLFIrcS: ESSAYSONTHECONVERGENCEOFNATIONALAND INrERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

(1969).
72.

PETER J. KATENSTEIN, BETWEEN POWER AND PLENTY: FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES OF
ADvANcED INDUSTRvAL STATES 4 (PETER J. KATZENSrE.N ed.) (1978).

73. James M. Snyder, Jr., Campaign Contributions as Investments:
Representatives,1980-1986, 98 J. OF POL. ECON. 1195 (1990).

The U.S. House of

74.
J.J. Pincus, PressureGroups and the Pattern of Tariffs, J. OF POL. ECON. 757, 834 (1975),
availableat http:llwww.jstor.orglfcgi-bin/jstor/viewiter.fcg/00223808/di971065/ 97p024m/0?currentres.
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sector influence when a dispute has arisen. This section will discuss how the
private sector influences trade negotiations" when a dispute involves both the
variables previously discussed-the three forms of government, 76 the importance of the affected industry to its economy, the ability of the interest coalition
to influence the government's position7-and the bargaining power of the
disputing governments.
A typical scenario that can give rise to a trade dispute and negotiation is
a claim of foreign protectionism. 7 The higher the level of protection by a
country, the more likely an affected company will seek government assistance,
because its market share could drop relative to the level of protection and
elasticity of demand for the foreign product. Thus, pressure is placed on the
exporting country authorities to complain to the importing country government.
For instance, if tariffs are lower domestically than in a protected foreign market,
a multinational industry may complain to its home government that such a tariff
results in lost market share because competitive imports are less expensive,
and/or because the domestic industry's foreign market share is lower because
the industry's product is more expensive in the foreign market.79 The
multinational industry could also claim some other form of an alleged breach
based on an internationally agreed-upon tariff binding or similar non-tariffbased promise by the foreign country to make concessions. Possible steps for
the government could include raising tariffs domestically for that industry or
claiming a competitive exception."0 Or, if the government wants to dissent, it
could enter into negotiations with the foreign government claiming a violation
of GATT/WTO rules."'
Three caveats extending the analysis froman initial general policy position
of a state on trade to the circumstance which require negotiations to resolve a
trade dispute. First, power-based bargaining positions in the negotiations are
recognized,"2 whereas it has been articulated that when a dispute is brought
75. While many have suggested the importance of other concerns such as social and political
conflicts in determining tariff levels, which is often claimed to be represented in voting behavior, this article
simplifies the analysis by placing primary emphasis on interest groups. KATZENSTEIN, supra note 72, at
333-36.
76.
Supra.
77. Supra
78.
This could include numerous claims under provisions of the GATr/WTO framework, such as:
Articles I, i, V, X, XI, and XII, to name a few.
79.
Of course, if domestic tariffs are lower, but the belief is that international or domestic market
share has not been affected, private sector complaints should not be forthcoming.

80.
For example, the "Escape Clause" of Article XIX of the GATr/WTO.
81.
Throughout the GATr/WTO agreements are provisions requiring negotiations before a dispute
can be brought before a WTO dispute settlement body.
82.
"It is international power that defines legal relationships among states." THOMAS D. LAMSON
& DAVID SKIDMORE, INTERNATIONAL POLITCAL ECONOMY: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND WEALTH 6

(1997).
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before a more institutionalized body, as would be the case with a WTO dispute
settlement panel, influences on the dispute based on power differentials between
parties to a dispute are said to be diminished. 3 Thus, the following analyses are
based on efforts to resolve trade disputes via negotiations, with the analysis
stopping short of submitting a complaint to a formal body, such as the WTO, to
resolve the dispute. Thus, power-based relations will play some role in the
analysis herein, albeit admittedly an arguable one because both expectations of
being haled into a forum that would diminish power-based relations if negotiations fail and an institutionally sanctioned remedial right to apply countervailing
duties might in themselves serve as a catalyst that relatively nullifies the influence
of those assumptions even in the negotiation stage.
Second, there will be a different degree of influence between the private
sector and the executive during the negotiations.8 4 As described, initial
penetrability will primarily be based on the government type classification. But
political allegiance by the interested collective group or industry in the dispute
to the political affiliation of the representative and the importance of the result
to the economy will increase the level of influence. It is also possible that intergovernment institutional relations would designate or reserve a political check
on the negotiating authority. This would be the case if a legislature, in
representing an interest of the private sector, is able to place political pressure
on the executive branch, which fields the trade negotiating team.
Lastly, during trade dispute negotiations, both countries will have a
perceived acceptable range of positions. The parameters representing acceptable agreements, as defined by the domestic influence on negotiations and
policy positions of the respective executive on the good in dispute, can be
described as a "win-set." 5 A large win-set, often when government positions
83.
84.

Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
The private sector influence was noted in establishing the initial government position for (or

the degree of protection).a given product classification or industry type in section: "IV. Collective Action
Groups & Political Influence on Trade Policy." Private sector influence on government positions may be the
attribute that caused the trade dispute in the first place. For instance, consider the process for assessing
countervailing duties on imports in the United States, a pluralist country, when government subsidies are
alleged. The International Trade Administration (ITA) is a division of the Commerce Department, which is
part of the executive branch but can also be influenced by Congress. Arun Venkataraman, BinationalPanels
and Multilateral Negotiations: A Two Track Approach to Limiting Contingent Protection, 23 COLuM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L 533, 553 (1999). The ITA makes a determination of whether foreign goods had been sold
at less than fair market value in the United States, which, it has found in 97% of the companies the agency
investigates Id. at 555. It has also been said that foreign producers lack faith in the objectivity of United
States domestic courts when they review Commerce Department findings. Id. at 560. If this is true, an already
overly biased and protectionist position is brought by the United States Trade Representative (also a
politically susceptible department as part of the executive) into trade dispute negotiations.
85.
See generally Putnam,supra note 4, at 435. Note that Putnam uses other domestic government
influences, such as the legislature, on a general international negotiating position (i.e., not necessarily trade),
rather than the private sector.
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are not far apart and/or are more flexible, makes an international agreement
more likely. 86 The stronger the private sector influence on government87 and
the greater the gravity of economic harm at issue, the more that governments
will be restrained, making a smaller win-set."
In the following graphical representations, the governments' initial international negotiating position without any domestic influences would be based
on the: 1) assessment of the economic importance of the industry to the
economy, as balanced against the 2) current governments' dedication to freer
trade. However, when there is a stronger private sector that is able to have its
position penetrate government negotiations, the influence from the domestic
level on the government's international negotiating position will be dependent
on: 1) the respective industry aggregation of interest (based on the collective
action principles previously discussed), and 2) the type of government structure.
The first example depicts a pluralist government that is economically more
powerful than a rival statist government that complains of the pluralist
government's use of protection in a critical industry with strong interest
representation in the private sector:
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86.
Putnam, supra note 4, at 437.
87.
The assumption here is that only domestic industries influence their respective governments,
but interest groups or coalitions of lobbies need not necessarily be solely of domestic origin. Foreign groups
& URSPRUNG,
can influence politicians in a trading country to enact voluntary export restraints, HRIM
supra note 37, at 729, or lessen tariff bindings on imports. T. SCHELLING, THE SRATEGY O1 CONFLICT 20910 (1960). Globalization of business illustrates a dynamic process whereby the private sector has crosscutting interests that affect trade policy, which makes a simplified domestic analysis seemingly unrealistic.
88. On rare occasion, it is also possible that the populace can influence government trade policy
in highly publicized or media-driven disputes, as has intermittently been the case with Japanese car imports.

88

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 7:67

The relative power of a country, generally based on the size of the
economy, can render an important role in bargaining at the international level
and the degree to which a trading partner will grant position flexibility with its
negotiating counterpart. Without the WTO/GATT rule framework, negotiations
between the dominant pluralist government and the weaker statist government
should favor the pluralist government. This is because weaker rule frameworks
often provide fewer and less objective guiding principles to the negotiating
parties and increases the degree to which leverage principles of power play.
Thus, if the dominant pluralist government is being accused of protectionism
by the statist government, negotiators of the pluralist government will be
partially restrained by a dominant ideological framework of freer trade in the
international system, thus relatively off-setting power differentials. While the
impact may be marginal for less important cases (i.e. giving the dominant state
more concessions), for very important circumstances or when there are
accumulated victories for the dominant state on results that seem inconsistent
with international cooperation, a backlash from other trading states may
eventually occur.8 9 The international trade framework should partially restrain
even more dominant states that might have engaged in protectionist measures.
The more pluralistic the government, the more influence the private sector
should be able to place on government trade policy, and the more that trade
positions or negotiations should reflect private sector interests and collective
action dynamics than on independent government economic or public policy
assessments cloistered apart from private sector influences. In the given
example, the dominant pluralist country is apt to elevate economic distortions
by taking a position farther from the optimal freer trade position and protect the
industry with a self-interested but globally sub-optimal negotiating policy
position. This is because the powerful pressure group has an extreme
protectionist position, moving the pluralist government's position away from
enhanced cooperation with the statist government on the issue to a location that
makes a mutually acceptable agreement unlikely.' In this scenario, when there
is no over-lap in the win-set, requesting the assistance of a third-party dispute
settlement institution, such as the WTO, is likely.
Domestic actors outside of government should have little influence on the
statist government's trade position, conferring it a unified international and
89.

While policy-makers generally have an incentive to "cheat" on international economic
agreements if it is in their own best self-interest or in the interest of their country, a more dominant country
should be more able to get away with defecting without being penalized. However, the likelihood of defecting
can be reduced by those states that expect to cooperate again in the future. ROBERT AXELROD, THE
EVOLUtION OF COOPERATION (1984).
90.
J.M. Finger et al., The PoliticalEconomy ofAdministeredProtection,72(3) AMER. ECON. REV.
452, 464 (1982), available at http://www.jstor.org/fcgi-bin/jstor/viewitem.fcg/00028282/di950028/95
pool3f/O?currentres.
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domestic disposition toward the dispute. For instance, if the pluralist
government were instead a statist government, the result of negotiations
between two statist governments should provide a larger win-set that is
influenced primarily by the relative power of the states, by what the negotiators
perceive to be in the best public interest of their respective countries, by each
country's dedication to international economic cooperation, by future
expectations about trade with this party, and by independent calculations of the
economic impact of an agreement. Regardless of these considerations, there
would only be one level of consideration during the negotiations for which the
governments should be concerned 9 -unlike the domestic influence when a
pluralist government is involved.
In the example as originally given, because the private sector influence is
so substantial and the industry is important to the economy, the dominant
pluralist government should make it even less flexible and improbable for the
win-set between the countries to over-lap. The probable result is that the
weaker statist government would grudgingly make more concessions than it
would ordinarily make than if the power disparity did not exist. Similarly,
because the statist government regularly interferes in the domestic economy and
the private and public sectors are often perceived as relatively unified,
appeasing an interest outside of government is not of as significant importance
as in a pluralist system. Thus, the government can and will make economic
adjustments domestically through the regular course of policy-making. In fact,
as is often the case in statist governments, economic adjustments will be made
by a counteracting domestic subsidization to the impacted industry, especially
if it is a moderately important industry to the country.
Taking a minor twist on the previous example, if there is a weak industry
representation, or if many over-lapping product interests exist, and it is a less
critical industry to the domestic economy in the dominant pluralist country, a
mutually acceptable agreement is more apt to be concluded because less is at
stake for the pluralist government. Therefore, the government's negotiating
position is more flexible. (See Figure 4 on next page).
With a weaker interest representation and less important industry, the
dominant pluralist government is likely to be more flexible in negotiations. Its
range of acceptable results will be larger and a mutually acceptable agreement
more likely. Also, when there is an overlapping win-set as depicted, it is less
likely that the dispute would be referred to a formal dispute settlement forum.
In the obverse, one might also conclude

91.
PETER F. COwHEY, States and Politics in American Foreign Economic Policy, in
1NIERNATIONALTRADE POUCIES: GAINS FROM EXCHANGE BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
(John S. OdeU & Thomas D. Willett eds., 1990).
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Figure 4
that this result is transpiring because there is a counter-balancing effect
engendered by weakening the domestic influence and strengthening the
importance of the ideological preferences or future expectations about pluralist
government's reliance on mutual cooperation. The only variables that have
changed are the domestic private sector interest and the importance of that
interest to the economy. Thus, the pluralist government's negotiating executive
might be said to be more sequestered from domestic private sector influences
as well as those of a larger scale in the economy.
In changing the scenario again, if a weaker statist government enacted a
protectionist measure on a product of a less important industry to its economy
against i stronger corporatist government with an economically important
export product, a depiction follows. (See Figure 5 on next page).
Because statist governments normally have at least a pseudo-control over
the domestic economy, it might have a natural institutionally based propensity
to be more hostile to opening markets that could undermine its economic plans
and programs. While this is theoretically palatable, statist governments have
also been known to drastically modify trade policy positions. This is particularly true if the country is less democratic in nature, as disappointing experiences may urge leaders to enact extreme protectionist positions, or even rapidly
open markets when assimilating the successes of similarly situated countries.'
This is unlike the situation in consolidated democracies since revolutionary or
abrupt change is often quelled by negotiated positions.
The
92.
The Asian Tigers are often cited as models of statist governmets that opened their doors to
freer trade and reaped economic success.
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Figure 5
assumption in this example is that the statist government is situated in a
protectionist position on this good, despite that the industry is less important to
its economy (which may in itself be somewhat philosophical and less
pragmatic). Thus, while the corporatist government's position will be
influenced by its private sector (but less so then in a similarly situated pluralist
government), elites in the statist government will be more apt to make trade
policy based on ideology, feasibility and need for cooperating on this good and

expectations about future cooperation, and acceptability of possible change
within domestic economic programs.
Many corporatist governments have been identified as being very
successful at flexibly adapting to open market principles through sagacious
long-term horizons." This is because they have tended to accept open-market
principles and adhered best to the ever-increasingly freer trade system because
domestic interest group structures have been pacified with joint policy-setting
between government and the private sector.9" In the aforementioned example,

93. KAZENSTEIN, supranote 27, at 205.
94. The Western European countries are the best example of corporatist structures. This institutional structure of government was employed to react to the catastrophic economic changes of the 1930s and
1940s by enhanced domestic cooperation between the private sector and government. Business, unions, and
government realized that limiting domestic quarrels were necessary so to better cooperate and adapt to
changing economic conditions in the world within the system of freer trade because the European states were
dependent on international trade and were not powerful enough to control the system. Id. at 30-38.
95. Probably one of the best examples of this close corporatist relationship between government
and business can be found in the European consortium Airbus, a relationship which resulted in a trade dispute
in the early 1990s with the United States claiming subsidization when Airbus significantly increased global
market share. Artemis March, The Future of the U.S. Aircraft Industry, TEht. REv. 26-36 (1990).
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the corporatist government has a moderately freer ideological position on trade.
Further, this particular good is an important export product. Private sector
pressure is diluted because the corporatist government's general policy melds
with the government's long-term economic programs, making a mutually
acceptable trade negotiating result with the statist government more likely.'
On the other hand, because the industry product is not as important to the statist
government, its original protectionist position will be more flexible toward
accepting an agreement with the stronger corporatist state. This is especially
true when the product is an important export product to the corporatist state.
For a final hypothetical scenario, consider a dominant corporatist state
with a critical industry to its economy, and a much weaker pluralist government
that has a minimal interest representation on the good at issue with a less
important export industry to its economy. The corporatist government has
enacted protectionist measures on the import of the pluralist country's good:
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Figure 6
The weaker pluralist government will likely make extensive concessions
because of the negligible domestic interest influence on the international
bargaining position and the less important export industry to its economy. In
fact, given this scenario, the pluralist country would be unlikely to even
complain about the dominant corporatist's protectionist measure, unless other
goods have been debated and disputes have been on-going between the two
countries, such that the current dispute is just more fuel for a recurring fire.

96.

This "long-term" program does not have the rigidity of a statist government.
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As is evident when considering these conjectural examples, within all
three government constructs, the states' positions in negotiations will be
dependent on a dedication to freer trade, private sector influence on the states'
position, and also the necessity of relying on trade to support their economies.'
Two governments that are more dedicated to freer trade and rely more on trade
as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) will be more prone to
conclude dispute negotiations in a more mutually satisfactory manner because
of the fear of reciprocal sanctions. The extent to which a government will be
flexible is influenced by the private sector and the severity of harm to the
domestic economy. The more severe the need to protect the domestic economy,
the more likely that a government will submit to protecting its domestic
economy and risk deeper trade cooperation.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has described the dynamics of private sector-government
relations in statist, corporatist, and pluralist governments within the context of
domestic influences on international trade policy preferences. While it is clear
that the international trading system, as framed in the GATT/WTO, has
structured restraints within which states will act, leaders/politicians have
positions and personal ideological and self-interested preferences on trade
issues that are influenced by the private sector and the domestic economy.
Statist governments have unification between the private and public
sectors on economic issues and a propensity to interfere more with market
mechanisms than other government forms. These aspects facially undermine
the GATT/WTO trade system and its premises regarding comparative
advantage because they are endemic institutional government attributes that
could tend to favor protectionism. However, this is not always the case because
of the oftentimes dependency on external resources and ideological shifts in
statist governments. The other extreme, pluralist governments tend to refrain
from enacting domestic economic regulations that undermines market
mechanisms. However, these governments are also often more susceptible to
protecting industry and sectors of the economy at the behest of private sector
lobbying, with the degree of protection correlated with power bases and
collective action dynamics. Lastly, corporatist systems, in having a pseudounification between the private and public sectors (but still having a defined
private sector), have been said to have more stable, foresighted, and planned
trade policy preferences," generally of a liberalized nature. This is attributable
97.
Ronald Rogowski, Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions, 41(2) IN'L ORG. 203,
206 (1987), available athttp:/www.jstor.org/fcgi-bin/jstor/viewitem.fcg/ 0020 1 83/ dm980258&98p0l45c/
O?cMuentres.
98. See generally KATZENSTEIN, supra note 27.
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to the aggregation of interests and negotiations between major economic actors
at the national level that would otherwise contend amongst themselves for trade
and tariff preferences. A policy supporting freer trade is generally incorporated
into these domestic level negotiations.
The government forms and subsequent influences by the private sector
precipitate complexities for national representatives negotiating over trade
disputes. When a trade dispute arises, nationally-oriented representatives will
have a policy position dependent on ideology, the states' relative dedication to
the international system of free trade and cooperation (often to the extent that
it has been "locked in" to international agreements by previous governments),
and the importance of the industry to the domestic economy. The collective
action influence from the private sector on the states' trade policy positions
should be influenced most in pluralist systems, depicting when domestic
politics have the most prominent impact on international economic relations.
The impact will be greater when the interest group aggregation is stronger. 9
Corporatist systems would be expected on average to have less extreme
positions being asserted by the private sector at the domestic level because of
aggregated collective bargaining at an earlier period. Therefore, the negotiators' position is more flexible and more apt to result in a mutually acceptable
agreement. A statist government would be expected to witness very little
private sector influence on international negotiations because the private sector
position is conceptually unified in the government's long-term economic
strategy for the country. Thus, the position of these economic production
entities in the economy should be the same as the government's position.
With all of these dynamics, obvious conclusions or generalizations cannot
be drawn about the position of particular governments on trade issues for the
future. The likely trend seems to be that the international trade framework (and
other international law economic agreements) will continue to pressure
domestic government institutions to more fully support market and trade
liberalization principles. Government interests may be privatized, especially
to the extent that intricate relations between government and internationally
competitive production entities may be under constant scrutiny of subsidization
claims by trading partners. 1" This would make countries with statist tendencies
gradually have more domestic private sector influence on government trade
99.
For example, special interest groups have been especially visible in international trade
agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Uruguay round of the General
Agreement on Tariff and Trade. Grossman & Helpman, supra note 50, at 675.
100. While this is the trend-removing government from production and subsidization of private
sector production so that market competition consistent with the international trade system will be
fostered--even in countries that have not previously played an intricate role in their economies, they have
over time become more deeply involved in regulating their economies. LAHRSON & SKIDMORB, supra note
82, at 6.
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policies because there would be a loss of control over a portion of the economy.
Those influences may still exist but be derived now, at least legally, from
outside the government, and within a trade framework that is continually
becoming more liberalized by agreements that establish precedence and bind
future governments from straying too far from previously agreed upon
principles. As has been described throughout this paper, this does not mean
that any particular type of state should necessarily be more prone to favor freer
trade or protectionism, but that government institutions that have had a natural
prejudice to support freer trade could be influenced more by ad hoc and
sporadically arising protectionist positions from the private sector (as is more
common in pluralist governments). Given a dispute might result in a similar
trade position that would have existed even without any institutional conversion
but with less government dominance or encompassing economic planning over
that trade policy.

